《No, Minister.(存一下英文版)》用其他笔名

17、【Interlude】S01E02.5 Cyril's Diary and Memos (1980.1.28-31)

　　Memorandum
　　Note for File
　　Ref: CH/OBS/005/80
　　To: A. Cavendish, Acting Perm. Sec.
　　From: A. Cavendish, Acting Perm. Sec.
　　Date: 31 January 1980
　　Subject: Post-Incident Assessment and Future Strategy: Newlyn, Cornwall
　　1. Objectives Achieved:
　　a) The Minister has successfully engaged with a local, high-visibility, multi-stakeholder conflict scenario.
　　b) The risks inherent in his impromptu performance style under high media pressure have been fully exposed.
　　c) A "controlled failure" has been successfully engineered, providing irrefutable justification for the DSC to claim the remit of "pre-coordination for major ministerial visits."
　　2. Ministerial Performance Assessment:
　　a) Seminar: Demonstrated strong personal charisma and a genuine desire to communicate. Successfully placated some fishermen and identified specific issues ("enforcement efficiency," "industrial pollution," "fuel subsidy process"). This is a positive signal, indicating an ability to translate broad ideals into actionable agenda items. His candour regarding the "inability to interfere with commercial bank decisions" unexpectedly built personal credibility and can be considered an "unintended benefit." The personal promise to John Tregenza (calling the bank) is noteworthy and requires follow-up assessment of its potential impact.
　　b) Seafood Festival: Oversimplified the issue by reducing its complexity to a "paradox," using inappropriate wording that led to one party losing control. Lacks public relations crisis management skills and underestimated local public sentiment. The physical altercation (seaweed incident), though accidental, highlights his vulnerability in complex public settings.
　　3. Media Reaction:
　　a) Tabloids (The Sun, Daily Mirror, etc.): Focused on the dramatic imagery of the "seaweed incident," attacking the government's "hypocrisy" and "detachment," but their narrative remains largely inflammatory and lacks depth.
　　b) Local Press (Plymouth Evening Herald, Western Morning News, etc.): Documented the events, emphasizing the Minister's morning commitments. The tone is relatively balanced and not entirely negative for the DSC.
　　c) Broadsheets (The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, etc.): Have begun to analyse the deeper social and policy conflicts behind the incident, offering complex interpretations of the Minister's image. This provides "analytical angles" that DSC public relations can leverage.
　　4. Next Steps:
　　a) Media Management: Instruct PPS (Cyril) to closely monitor follow-up coverage, prepare a detailed media summary, and coordinate with the No. 10 Press Office. Leverage the analytical angles of the broadsheets to frame the event as a "catalyst exposing deep-seated national issues," rather than a "personal failure of the Minister." Emphasize the indispensable role of the DSC in "coordinating local needs with central policy."
　　b) Remit Expansion Request: Immediately draft a memorandum to the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Albert), using the Cornwall incident as a case study, to formally request that "inter-departmental pre-coordination for all ministerial-level local visits" be included in the DSC's mandatory terms of reference. Emphasize that this aims to "protect the government's image, enhance policy synergy, and prevent similar public relations risks."
　　c) Ministerial Follow-up: Ensure the Minister fully comprehends the "deeper value" of this incident. His anger and clarity will be key drivers in shaping his future behaviour.
　　Conclusion:
　　The Cornwall trip was a successful stress test. The Minister's "intuition and action" have effectively interacted with the system's "invisible control." He is beginning to understand the existence of the "unseen hand." The next step is to deepen that understanding.
　　A. Cavendish
　　---
　　---
　　---
　　January 31st, 1980, Thursday.
　　70 Whitehall, London, Cabinet Office.
　　Alistair was sitting in the office of Sir Albert Sackville, the Cabinet Secretary. A document lay on the desk between them.
　　"Sir Albert," Alistair's tone was as even as ever. "I am here to report on the follow-up to the ministerial visit to Newlyn, Cornwall, and to present a related proposal."
　　Sir Albert sat back in his large leather chair, his fingers tapping lightly on the desk. His eyes scanned the title of the memorandum before him: A Procedural Proposal for Optimising the Inter-Departmental Coordination of High-Level Local Visits to Uphold the Government's Image.
　　He did not open the document immediately. Instead, he looked at Alistair.
　　"Alistair, I hear that Minister Hyde's encounter in Cornwall has become the latest talk of Fleet Street," his voice was calm, betraying no bias. "The possibilities you raised in your risk assessment... seem to have all come to pass."
　　"Thank you for your attention, Sir Albert," Alistair replied, his demeanour respectful but firm. "Risk assessment is one of the DSC's core functions. It is precisely because this incident exposed a lack of coordination that I have taken the liberty of submitting this memorandum. It aims to provide a more synergistic framework for the future, to prevent a recurrence of events that are embarrassing to the government."
　　Only then did Albert pick up the document and open it.
　　The core of the memorandum proposed the establishment of a non-mandatory, purely informational reporting system. Departments could inform the DSC of their ministers' local itineraries in advance, and the DSC would be responsible for cross-referencing them and flagging potential conflicts or risks.
　　He read it word by word, his face impassive. When he finished, he slowly closed the file.
　　"Non-mandatory?" Albert raised a slight eyebrow. "You have always been a proponent of efficiency."
　　"Sir Albert." Alistair met his gaze. "In Whitehall, an irrefutable 'recommendation' is sometimes more effective than a forceful directive."
　　He paused. "If departments choose not to report their plans, and another 'public relations disaster' like Cornwall occurs in the future, then the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office will have every reason to hold the non-'synergistic' department accountable. This 'non-mandatory' mechanism, paradoxically, compels them to proactively seek our 'advice' to mitigate their own risks."
　　Albert's gaze rested on Alistair's face for a long moment. In the end, he gave no definitive answer, merely tapping his fingers on the desk.
　　A few days later, an Internal Circular from the Prime Minister's Office was quietly distributed to all departments:
　　Internal Circular
　　Prime Minister's Office
　　Ref: PMO/IC/007/80
　　Cc: All Permanent Secretaries
　　From: Cabinet Office (on advice from No.10 Press Office)
　　Date: 4 February 1980
　　Subject: Recommendation for Enhancing the Overall Synergy of Government Visits to the Regions
　　To continuously optimise the overall synergistic effectiveness of high-level departmental visits to the regions, No. 10 Downing Street recommends that, when planning local itineraries for Ministers or officials of equivalent rank, departments may, in the spirit of courtesy and synergy, engage in preliminary communication with the Department of Synergy Coordination (DSC). The DSC will be responsible for collating relevant information and may provide informational reference and risk assessment on potential schedule conflicts or public relations risks.
　　This measure is intended to promote the flow of information within government, enhance foresight in decision-making, and thereby better serve the public interest. This is a non-mandatory recommendation and does not alter the autonomous planning and decision-making authority of individual departments.
　　For information.